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The Savior or the Saved: Newman and Survival at Auschwitz
Beth Bloom
Cyril O‘Regan‘s lectures on John Henry
Newman have brought to my mind the writings
of Viktor Frankl, concentration camp survivor,
psychiatrist, and author of Man‘s Search for
Meaning1 and the psychotherapeutic doctrine,
logotherapy. Newman‘s and Frankl‘s particular
philosophical approaches to the meaning of human life sparked my interest in comparing the
two.
Both assert that each of us has a mission,
and that mission is sacrosanct. According to Newman, that mission is for one to be saved, to be
close to God, which is achieved through a combination of intellect and imagination and expressed
through revelation or the mediation of Christ.2
Frankl understands mission to be an end in itself,
the objective of man‘s existence and, ultimately,
survival. This essay examines briefly how the acceptance of Christianity (God‘s work) and the
natural urge for survival both function ultimately
as expressions of mission.
According to John Henry Newman, there
are three channels through which nature informs
our knowledge of God: our own minds, the voice
of mankind, and the course of human knowledge
and affairs.3 Perhaps the most affecting is our
own mind, or Conscience, its alter-ego, which
maintains for us the capacity to interpret and apply the efficacy of outside stimulus in our search
for truth. This Conscience avails us the knowledge of God and the attendant moral code by
which we must live. Societal changes, industrialization, nationalization, and the resultant denaturation of religion erode this code and our sense of
the goodness of God. ―I take our natural perception of right and wrong as the standard for determining the characteristics of Natural religion and
I use the religious rites and traditions which are
actually found in the world, only so far as they
agree with our moral sense,‖ says Newman.4
Perhaps the ultimate manifestation of the
denaturation of religion was Auschwitz, one of
the most notoriously horrific concentration
camps in Poland during the Second World War, -a paragon of sadistic human behavior. ―It is very
difficult for an outsider to grasp how very little

value was placed on human life in camp.‖5 Prisoners were kept in unheated, filthy conditions;
capricious guards shot innocent prisoners at will;
bedraggled captives, protected only by ragged
uniforms and decaying shoes, were forced at
gunpoint to pull carts filled with emaciated, dying
prisoners for miles, often in the snow. He adds,
―Everything that was not connected with the immediate task of keeping oneself and one‘s closest
friends alive lost its value.‖6
How would Newman diagnose life at
Auschwitz, and what would be his prescription
for moral certitude? He might suggest that the
breakdown of community and morality in the
modern, external world, to which he often refers,
mirrors those issues in microcosm in the concentration camp, but that, despite the ghastly conditions created therein, human Conscience and
moral sense could safely reside in those blessed
with Christianity.
Both Newman and Frankl seem to agree
that living a good life is not the secret to being
saved. Real assent involves transformation of self.
It is an internal process. Merit does not equal salvation, neither in the camps nor in the outside
world. One must take responsibility for one‘s salvation, with God and within the camps. Here one
can see the juxtaposition between the redeemed
and the rescued.
According to Frankl, responsibility is the
very essence of human existence. ..Everything can
be taken from a man but one thing; . . . to choose
one‘s attitude in any given set of circumstances,
to choose one‘s own way.7 Man can make an inner decision to overcome external horror by retaining his human dignity. This ―…spiritual freedom –which cannot be taken away—makes life
meaningful and purposeful,‖ he says.8 If one cannot change the cause of his or her suffering, one
can still change his or her attitude ―by facing a
fate which one cannot change but may rise above
and by so doing change himself and turn personal tragedy into triumph.‖9 Frankl concluded
that those prisoners who responded to their condition by allowing fate to take over avoided responsibility; such apathy in these conditions was
a shortcut to death.10
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Similarly, Newman might assert that the
moral code induced by Conscience could inure
camp victims from physical horror with its own
version of ―spiritual freedom‖. The notion of sin
and its intrinsic hatefulness prepare a person for
the ―evidences of Christianity, which recognize
the divine presence of God, a belief in the worth
of the soul, the momentousness of the unseen
world, an understanding that, in proportion as
we partake in our own persons of the attributes
which we admire in Him, we are dear to Him,‖
he notes.11 Moral obligation is the voice of God
and represents the meaning of life. Holiness is His
gift. Could that gift help those in the concentration camps? Frankl seems to believe so: ―In the
concentration camp, only the men who allowed
their inner hold on their moral and spiritual
selves to subside eventually fell victim to the
camp‘s degenerating influences.‖12 ―The consciousness of ones ‘inner value is anchored in
higher, more spiritual things, and cannot be
shaken by camp life.‖13
Both men assert that devotion to something other than the self is that which saves. To
Frankl, ―everyone has his own specific vocation
or mission in life to carry out a concrete assignment, which demands fulfillment. It is life‘s mission‖14 [such as his own work on logotherapy],
but also the image and love of his wife. ―A man
who becomes conscious of the responsibility he
bears toward a human being who affectionately
waits for him, or to an unfinished work, will
never be able to throw away his life. He knows
the ‗why‘ for his existence, and will be able to
bear almost any ‗how‘.‖15 Newman believes that it
is the gift of holiness, the sense of moral obligation, from God, which allows humans to focus on
an objective far beyond the self, despite adversity:
―Yes, so it is; realize it, my brethren; -everyone who breathes, high and low, educated and ignorant, young and old, man and
women, has a mission, has a work. We are not
sent into this world for nothing; we are not
born at random;….God sees every one of us;
He creates every soul, He lodges it in the body,
one by one, for a purpose. He needs … every
one of us; we are all equal in His sight, and we
are placed in our different ranks and stations… to labour in them for Him. As Christ
has His work, we too have ours.‖16

Thus both would agree that one‘s life is
defined by much more than experience; commit-

ment to life‘s tasks, goals and mission provide justification and meaning. Rather than asking ―what
do I expect from life?‖ perhaps one should ask,
―what does life expect from me?‖17
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Newman, ―Liberalism,‖ and the Early Church
Nancy Enright
In the Catholic Studies Seminar of 2011,
co-sponsored by the Center for Vocation and Servant Leadership and conducted by Dr. Cyril O‘Regan of Notre Dame University, the topic of Newman‘s ―anti-liberal‖ stance recurred several times.
In Newman‘s ―Position of my Mind since
1845‖ (Apologia Pro Vita Sua) he talks about how
the definition of the word ―liberalism‖ has
changed even since his own youth, when it
named a periodical created by Lord Byron. Next,
Newman says, it was ―a theological school.‖ Now,
at the time of Newman‘s writing, it is, ―nothing
else than that deep, plausible skepticism,…the
development of human reason, as practically exercised by the natural man.‖1 In the discussion,
some of us raised concerns about Newman being
perhaps less vocal about some of the issues addressed by the ―liberalism‖ of his day than other
saints and contemporary clergy. However, Dr.
O‘Regan, and others, clarified that for Newman
the government linked with even some positive
liberal policies of the day was also linked with the
oppression of Catholics and of Ireland, and the
kind of rational skepticism that Newman abhorred and referred to in the quote above in regard to the definition of the term. What one must
be very careful about doing is assuming, based on
his attacks on liberalism, that Newman would be
a ―conservative‖ in the sense the word has in
America today. What I would argue is that for
Newman the true path lies much deeper than the
so-called conservative politics of today or of his
own day, though he did identify more with the
Tories than the Whigs. However, it would seem
from the sampling of his writings that we read
during the seminar that the heart of Newman‘s
beliefs is rooted in his deep and abiding love for
the early Church and his desire to bring the type
of Christianity lived then into the life of the contemporary Church of his own time.
Twenty-first century Americans, whether
―conservative‖ or ―liberal‖ would find much in
the writings of Newman to challenge some of our
basic assumptions. For example, in his ―Notes‖
entitled ―Liberalism‖ Newman challenges the basic principles under which America was founded;
in #16, he gives as a principle of liberalism: ―It is

lawful to rise in arms against legitimate princes,‖
and in #17: ―The people are the legitimate source
of power‖ and ―Universal Suffrage is among the
natural rights of man.‖ Apparently, Newman
would challenge both of these positions. The
American Revolution and our whole system of
government would seem to be rooted in exactly
those two ideas, and certainly neither
―conservatives‖ nor ―liberals‖ of today would argue with either of them. However, I am not sure
that these differences with Newman are as important as the sweeping challenge of Newman‘s remarks about wealth and notoriety, words extremely relevant to today‘s society:
This is what I am insisting on, not
what they actually do or what they are,
but what they revere, what they adore,
what their gods are. Their god is
mammon; I do not mean to say that all
seek to be wealthy, but that all bow
down before wealth. Wealth is that to
which the multitude of men pay an
instinctive homage. They measure
happiness by wealth; and by wealth
they measure respectability.‖2

Such words are hard to classify in terms of today‘s classifications of ―liberal‖ and
―conservative,‖ though they would seem to me to
be even more of a challenge to the right than to
the left. More to the purpose, they go against
many of the assumptions of our popular (as opposed to our political) culture, and this challenge
becomes even more telling for us, living in the
era of reality TV shows and the e-channel, in
Newman‘s attack on the modern love of
―notoriety‖:
All men cannot be notorious: the multitudes
who thus honour notoriety, do not seek it
themselves; nor am I speaking of what men do,
but how they judge; yet instances do occur
from time to time of wretched men, so smitten
with passion for notoriety, as even to dare in
fact some detestable and wanton act, not from
love of it, not from liking or dislike of the person against whom it is directed, but simply in
order thereby to gratify this impure desire of
being talked about, and gazed upon. ―These
are thy gods, O Israel!‖3
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Our whole culture that worships fame and money,
and whose politics, going beyond even the
sharply divided party lines, seem to reflect an inordinate reverence for these two worldly concerns, is deeply critiqued by Newman‘s statements.
In light of this critique of his own and,
implicitly, our own culture, what is Newman advocating instead? Though I am far from an expert on Newman, I can say that the one aspect of
his thought that struck me most powerfully in the
seminar was his love of the early Church. This
love was not simple nostalgia, by any means, nor
was it mere ―conservativism‖ in the sense of
keeping things the same because the Church of
Newman‘s day had traveled far from its origins.
Newman‘s early Evangelicalism, when he encountered Christ in a personal way that felt more
real to him ―than the fact that he had hands or
feet,‖ as Msgr. Liddy recounted in the seminar,
led him to a search for a faith that was most
linked to the Source of Love whom he encountered in that moment. This search led Newman
through the high Anglicanism of the Oxford
Movement and ultimately to the Roman Catholic
Church, as the church, he believed, most connected with Christ historically and sacramentally.
However, he strove in his writings to bring his
beloved Church back to its roots. This love for the
early Church is clearly seen in the passionate way
Newman writes about the early Church in The
Grammar of Assent.
Interestingly, Newman‘s account of the
early church links powerfully with his critique of
the modern (i.e. nineteenth century) pursuit of
wealth and ―notoriety,‖ as well as conveying a
profound challenge to our own society and its
values. Newman points out, ―still the rule held,
that the great mass of Christians were to be found
in those classes which were of no account in the
world, whether on the score of rank or of education.‖4 Newman quotes the mockeries of the
―low-born Christians,‖ such as the description of
the early Church by Caecilius: ―The greater part
of you are worn with want, cold, toil, and famine;
men collected from the lowest dregs of the people; ignorant, credulous women;‖ ―unpolished
boors, illiterate, ignorant even of the sordid arts
of life; they do not understand even civil matters,
how can they understand divine?‖ Newman says
that even the Fathers themselves describe the
early Church similarly, as in the quote he gives

from Jerome: ―They are gathered not from the
Academy or Lyceum, but from the low populace.‖5 Newman, rising from Oxford (the Academy or Lyceum of his day), speaks with the deepest respect and even awe of these uneducated but
powerful believers. ―How came such men to be
converted?‖ he asks, and ―being converted, how
came such men to overturn the world?‖6
Newman speaks of the sufferings of the
early Christians, as recounted by Tacitus, who
tells of the persecution under Nero: ―Mockery
was added to death; clad in skins of beasts, they
were torn to pieces by dogs; they were nailed up
to crosses; they were made inflammable…‖ He
recounts Pliny‘s letters to the emperor Trajan
about how he handles Christians accused under
his governance, saying that he asks them to offer
sacrifice to the gods and ―wine and incense to the
Emperor‘s image,‖ and to curse the name of
Christ. If they do these things, Pliny says, ―I let
them go; for I am told nothing can compel a real
Christian to do any of these things.‖7 Newman
goes on to recount in page after page stories of
these suffering and devoted early Christians. He
tells of Polycarp, martyred at the age of eighty-six,
and of Blandina, a slave, tortured and killed in the
persecution at Lyon, as recounted by Eusebius.
Newman gets to the heart of the matter by looking at where the early Christians got their
strength: ―How clearly do we see all through this
narrative what it was which nerved them for the
combat! If they love their brethren, it is in the
fellowship of their Lord; if they look for heaven, it
is because He is the Light of it.‖8
For Newman, the relationship with Christ,
into which he entered at the age of fifteen, was
the central motivation of the early Church. This
relationship leads to a community that goes beyond all definitions of ―liberal‖ or ―conservative.‖
What could be more conservative than returning
to the very roots of a two thousand year old faith,
rooted in the Jewish tradition that is thousands of
years older? However, what could be more liberal than a faith that enjoins a lifestyle that is beyond class and status, that enjoins giving away
property and a radical sharing of wealth? A lifestyle in which ―the one who gathered much did
not have too much, and the one who gathered
little did not have too little‖ (Ex. 16:18). The
early Christians did not have class conflicts because ―there were no needy persons among them.
For from time to time those who owned land or
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houses sold them, brought the money from the
sales 35 and put it at the apostles‘ feet, and it was
distributed to anyone who had need‖ (Acts 4:3435). Again, ―All the believers were together and
had everything in common. 45 They sold property
and possessions to give to anyone who had need.
46 Every day they continued to meet together in
the temple courts. They broke bread in their
homes and ate together with glad and sincere
hearts, 47 praising God and enjoying the favor of
all the people. And the Lord added to their number daily those who were being saved‖ (Acts 2: 44
-47). This is the world of the early Church that
inspired Newman. Rooted in the personal relationship with Christ that transformed his life, the
early Christians created a society that was unique
in its time but not fully practiced in our times, or
in most proceeding times (including Newman‘s).
The seminar and Newman‘s writings call contemporary believers to a faith like theirs.

1

Apologia Pro Vita Sua. Ed. Martin J. Svaglic. Oxford:
Clarendon, 1967, 234.
2 ―Discourses to Mixed Congregations – Discourse 5.‖
Newman Reader. The National Institute for Newman
Studies, 2007, 4.
3 ―Discourses to Mixed Congregations – Discourse 5.‖
Newman Reader, 5.
4 Grammar of Assent. Ed. Charles Frederick Harrold,
356.
5 Grammar of Assent, 357.
6 Grammar of Assent, 357.
7 Grammar of Assent, 359.
8 Grammar of Assent, 367.
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Newman‘s Epistemology: Literal Saints
Jonathan Farina
Cyril O‘Regan suggested during our seminar that one of the new cultural shifts John Henry
Newman registers in The Grammar of Assent and
other writings is the invalidation of the categories
of holiness or saintliness and sin: Newman sensed
that holiness and sin were no longer knowable
and relevant subjects for nineteenth-century Britons. Victorian literary historians recognize this as
one theological instance of a widespread epistemic and political shift, as I‘ll explain briefly below, but O‘Regan‘s talk and our brief readings in
The Grammar of Ascent made me suspect that
Newman‘s response to this shift is not just akin to
his fellow ―sage,‖ Thomas Carlyle‘s, but also to
the realist novelists. Troubles with believing in
holiness and sainthood were analogous to troubles believing in the work of fiction. And the language of both Newman and the realists responds
to this with certain recognizable tropes that aspire to validate the epistemological authority of
―assent‖ and ―fiction.‖

The poet and philosopher Samuel TaylorColeridge fought against the cultural impact of
this with an idea in On the Constitution of
Church and State, a fairly widely read work in
the Victorian period, of a ―clerisy‖ class or
―national church‖ composed of ―the learned of
all denominations … the sages and professors of
the law and jurisprudence; of medicine and
physiology; of music; of military and civil architecture; of the physical sciences; with the mathematical as the common organ of the preceding; in
short, all the so called liberal arts and sciences,
the possession and application of which constitute
the civilization of a country, as well as the Theological.‖1 This body of individuals would be
saints, so to speak, of ―culture‖—a concept that
was then only just beginning to accrete the kinds
of meanings it holds now—who would be responsible for maintaining the nation‘s historical
identity and for furthering it, modeling it, for everyday Britons.

A believer in Apostolic Succession, the
transmission of Jesus‘s sacramental, ecclesiastical,
and spiritual authority through the apostles
through the bishops, Newman‘s notion of sainthood and Episcopal Church was a theological
form of historicist inheritance: present Christians
were tied to the history of Christians through the
living church and its saints. This notion had its
parallel in English notions of aristocracy as inherited obligation to shepherd the common classes,
to improve the nation, but only, as the influential
18th-century MP and author Edmund Burke had
it, with respectful allegiance to the past. For orators like Burke, there was no nation without a living past. And so, the attenuation of the aristocracy that was legislated in the Great Reform Act
of 1832 in Britain, but globally instantiated in the
emergence of the United States and in the French
Revolutions, very naturally had its epistemic impact on British religious sentiment, as religion
was, even in the age of doubt, a large part of everyday Victorian life: just as many Britons were
beginning to wean themselves off of an implicit
political faith in an aristocracy justified by inherited nobility of blood many lost spiritual faith in
the sense of inherited holiness passing through
bishops and saints.

Where Newman promoted saints and holy
days and Coleridge promoted a clerical class,
Carlyle promoted ―heroes,‖ past and present. His

On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History (1840) characterized belief in heroes as a
kind of secularized or at least nondenominational spirituality. Odin, Cromwell, Napoleon, Martin Luther, Shakespeare, Dante, Samuel Johnson, Rousseau, Robert Burns, John Knox,
and Mahomet all model types of heroism—
divines, prophets, priests, poets, kings, and men
of letters.2 And men of letters were the 19thcentury embodiment of sainthood for Carlyle:
the Man of Letters is sent hither specially that he may discern for himself,
and make manifest to us, this same
Divine Idea: in every new generation
it will manifest itself in a new dialect;
and he is there for the purpose of doing that. Such is Fichte‘s phraseology;
with which we need not quarrel. It is
his way of naming what I here, by
other words, am striving imperfectly
to name; what there is at present no
name for: The unspeakable Divine
Significance, full of splendor, of wonder and terror, that lies in the being of
9

every man, of everything,—
the Presence of the God who
made every man and thing.
(186)

Carlyle recognizes that the cultural investment
that was formally made in saints had been transferred to writing. Print bore the authority that
saints and holiness had formerly held. Men of letters had, for better or worse, become the media of
the past and the repositories of value.
But, unlike Coleridge, Carlyle did not
want a nation of philosophizing. He also did not
want a nation of skeptics and finicky, critical
thinkers; he wanted believers and doers:
For the Scepticism, as I said, is not intellectual only; it is moral also; a
chronic atrophy and disease of the
whole soul. A man lives by believing
something; not by debating and arguing about many things. A sad case for
him when all that he can manage to
believe is something he can button in
his pocket, and with one or the other
organ eat and digest! Lower than that
he will not get. (206)

Newman clearly was not interested in replacing
traditional saints and holiness with Carlyle‘s
books and men of letters. But the style of his prose
attests that he shared the new Victorian epistemology of faith with Carlyle and some of his men
(and women) of letters. The epistemology underwriting Newman‘s own defense of belief was one
that also underwrote 19th-century defenses of fiction and culture, of forms of knowing other than
empiricism, numeracy, and the other ―fact‖based arguments that Newman rebuts in The
Grammar of Assent.
Victorianists well know Newman‘s prose
for its prophetic gusto and passion, features that
we typically rely upon to compare him to Carlyle,
Matthew Arnold, and John Ruskin. But there are
other, more subtle features that connect him to
figures like George Eliot, Dickens, G. H. Lewes,
and other novelists that we now denominate
―realist.‖ Realism emerged in England as a named
concept in the early 1850s with John Ruskin‘s
Modern Painters and essays by George Lewes and
George Eliot in the Westminster Review.3 The explicit tenet is a commitment to recording ―things
as they are,‖ common people and their common

lives, with sympathy for all their inglorious ordinariness. Newman certainly shares this in his humility and sympathy.
But he employs some other more subtle
and complex tropes that also distinguish realism.
Probability is first and foremost of these features.
Newman holds that ―from probabilities we can
construct legitimate proof‖ (312); he writes of
―the legitimate force of this antecedent probability‖ (320); and founds arguments on ―what is so
probable in anticipation‖ (327). The probable
was a hallmark trope in the history of the novel in
England, especially in early reviews of Austen and
in earlier justification of the epistemic category of
fiction, itself, as form of virtual reality or imagined or probable truth.4 Novelists had to justify
fiction as a moral medium and a source of truth
because it was imagined, not recorded from experience. Analogously, revealed religion is only
selectively revealed and so it was open to the
same critiques as fiction was and therefore ready
to adopt a similar vocabulary of justification.
Newman also invokes the language of ―mutual
reference,‖ ―fit,‖ and ―variety‖ (309) characteristic of conservative early 18th-century moral philosophy (Samuel Clarke, for example) and 19thcentury natural history (―fitness‖ and ―variation‖
would be key terms for Darwin) as well as Victorian realism: Dickens‘s Our Mutual Friend, for
example, or Middlemarch‘s the social web, for
another.
These all deserve lengthy attention, but I
want to focus my last few remarks on a more subtle feature of realist style: suspense. Caroline Levine has recently described suspense as a key feature of the realist aesthetic. She remarks how
John Ruskin in ―the clearest theoretical articulation of the epistemological seriousness of narrative suspense … prescribes the experimental
method in order to encourage his readers into a
permanently suspenseful relationship to the
world.‖5 Newman‘s Grammar of Assent also
teems with suspense and asks readers to cultivate
a suspenseful orientation to the world. Yet Newman‘s prose affirms a salutary suspense affiliated
neither with skepticism nor with scientific doubt,
but with belief: ―the anticipation … the expectation … This presentiment‖ (321); ―looking out
for it‖ (330); ―faithful expectation … a condition
of their covenant‖ (331); ―the promise forfeited
and the promise fulfilled‖ (333); ―exceeding expectation!‖ (361); ―I have been forestalling all
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along … necessarily forestalling it … the fulfillment of the promise‖ (370-1), and so on.
Such suspense inheres in Christian theology, in the promise of a messiah and the promise
of salvation, however the frequency of Newman‘s
reiteration of it suggests a parallel between The
Grammar of Assent and the realist novelists. Both
validated kinds of knowledge that were losing
authority to statistics, physical sciences, and other
modern modes of fact-, money-, and realitymaking. Suspense reinforces Newman‘s concern
with maintaining a sense of the past and of embodying that past in saints who‘ll entail their holiness to the future, and yet it does so by subtly invoking the affiliation to skeptical experimental
science that Levine tracks in realist fiction. One
might liken this to the Kantian ―regulative,‖ the
imperative to behave ―as if‖ we knew God for
certain,6 for the grammar of ―as if‖ produces the
suspenseful gap that Levine describes; but where
the Kantian ―regulative‖ concedes a horizon of
knowability—we can only ever know these things
―as if‖ they were true—I think for Newman, like
for the realists, this was a suspense whose conclusion felt guaranteed, if ―necessarily forestalled.‖
That is a different form of knowledge than the
suspense of the empiricists; it is the truth of fiction and the truth of Newman‘s genuine ―assent.‖
And it required heroic men of letters to articulate
in an age that seemed poised to praise the fact
and forgo the ―holy.‖

Taylor Coleridge, On the Constitution of
Church and State (London: Hurst, Chance, and Co.,
1 Samuel

1830), 47.
2 Thomas Carlyle, On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the
Heroic in History (London: Chapman and Hall, 1840).
3 See [George Eliot], ―Art and Belles Lettres,‖ Westminster Review 65: 128 (April 1856), 625-650 and
George Henry Lewes, ―Realism in Art: Recent German
Fiction,‖ Westminster Review 70:138 (October, 1858),
488-518.
4 See, for starters, Michael McKeon, The Origins of the
English Novel, 1600-1740 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987) and The Secret History of

Domesticity: Public, Private, and the Division of
Knowledge (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2005), and Douglas Lane Patey, Probability and
Literary Form: Philosophic Theory and Literary Practice in the Augustan Age (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
5 Caroline Levine, The Serious Pleasures of Suspense:

Victorian Realism and Narrative Doubt
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2003),
55.
6 See Kant‘s Critique of Pure Reason, particularly I.8
and I.9.
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A Grammar for Consent
Al Frank
The 19th century classical education John
Henry Newman experienced is not even a distant
memory for today‘s university students. Contemporary course offerings range far beyond anything Newman could have conceived, especially
in the sciences, business and finance and politics
and diplomacy. Multiple media compete for attention in a Wi-Fi world where few fingers refrain from playing symphonies in 4G or many
heads remain disconnected for long from a pair
of ear buds. This is nothing to regret, because the
ability to command information at light-speed is
of enormous benefit.
What remains constant is the challenge of
making prudent judgments about the data‘s value,
personally and to society. In helping with this discernment, today‘s universities are no different
from those in Newman‘s time, especially at
schools where religion is a component of the core
curriculum. As Durham University‘s Gerald
Loughlin noted, ―Newman argued that there is no
university where there is no theology‖ (Ker 223).
Truly, the religious perspective is essential in
molding the ―servant leaders‖ Seton Hall University aims to cultivate.
By exploring the scriptural, historical,
theological and the sacramental, students can
achieve a more advanced intellectual grounding
in religious tradition than provided in most
homes, parish catechetical programs and certainly in most high schools. In collaboration with
classmates, there is the intellectual satisfaction –
even joy – brought by the discovery of new concepts. When this leads to forming values and
judgments, the exposure can inject an invaluable
dynamic into the development of young adults at
a time when they are likely to be more reflective
and predisposed to build upon the experience.
Extracurricular service can refine skills that bring
to maturity the ―servant leaders‖ sent forth at
each baccalaureate commencement.
The best instructors will serve as intellectual guides and personal models in helping students embrace their full potential. Newman believed ―the essential principle of the university is
‗the professorial system,‘‖ which provides ―the
living influence of one person on another, the

teacher on the taught‖ (Liddy, 24). ―Books are
important instruments in the consolidation and
communication of this knowledge, but the influence of a teacher provides what books never
can.‖
For this pattern of growth, Newman‘s life
provides a model. Perhaps precociously, he was
touched by an awareness of the divine at age 15.
Yet, his questioning did not end and additional
introspection led him from Anglicanism to his
profession of faith in the Roman Catholic Church.
Even more questioning led to a daunting ministry
of evangelization. Newman‘s embrace of the one,
true faith brought him a sense of fundamental
rightness in finding his place in ―the land of milk
and honey‖ (Martin, 113).
For many of today‘s youth, the experience
is just the opposite. They may be ―cradle Catholics,‖ or adherents to the religion of their parents,
but, once they have completed rites-of-passage,
like confirmation or bar/bat mitzvahs, few experience further growth in faith and many leave
aside devotional practice. As a Catholic university,
Seton Hall offers the opportunity to recover and
enrich what lies in dormancy.
This building of competency in religion
can be compared to the maturing of writing and
reading skills, which is the objective of core English classes. Students are urged to find relationships among the assigned readings and to reflect
on these links—and contrasts—in essays or research papers. The process emphasizes not the
vapid spouting of opinion but the articulation of
reasoned arguments based on academic evidence.
Religious studies courses provide a similar template and the concomitant self-discovery can lead
to the kind of introspection and conversion that
hone maturity and servant leadership.
Essential is a curriculum that examines
many voices and traditions as befits the diverse
society in which we live and which our students
will serve and lead. Msgr. Richard Liddy says
Newman describes this as a ―philosophical or
theological attitude or openness‖ in The Idea of a
University.
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The Seton Hall core curriculum describes
this as embracing ―the questions central but not
exclusive to the Catholic intellectual tradition.‖ In
this way, Seton Hall provides the platform for developing the critical thinking that enables students to learn ―how all the sciences and professions taught in the university relate to each other‖
in a process that spawns natural wisdom. Out of
that can grow supernatural wisdom in which the
person‘s relationship with the universe—and
God—can mature (Liddy, 26).
Catholicism remains the heart of the university‘s identity. This ancient and universal tradition provides the fundamental frame-ofreference and comprises legitimate ground for
academic inquiry.

history, with only indirect bearings upon modern
times; I cannot allow that it is a mere historical
religion. Certainly it has its foundations in past
and glorious memories, but its power is in the
present.‖ (Newman 371)
―We‘re not any different now,‖ O‘Regan said.

Also abiding, no matter the era, is the college experience of maturing individual identity
and finding one‘s place in society. When these
goals are earnestly pursued in the context of a
university education steeped in the Catholic tradition, servant leadership and committed faith are
more likely outcomes.

Within this process, young adults are led
to a deeper realization of what it means at Baptism to be immersed in eternal life and to become
a daughter or son of God. From that understanding comes a deeper appreciation of how the divinized life is sustained and enriched by continuous access to the sacraments—those portals to the
stream of grace—particularly the selfexamination and growth provided in encountering Christ in confession and the nourishment He
directly provides in the Eucharist.
There is in intellect— if not in fact—a link
between classroom and chapel that can provide
God‘s daughters and sons a sense of their place in
the communion in which they stand, even an impetus to wholehearted consent to living the Gospel. The blending of scriptural, historical, theological and sacramental comprehension is what
advances the college inquiry beyond the religious
instruction of the past. Discerning their rightful
places within the Communion of Saints is what
motivates many students to participate in DOVE,
FOCUS, prayer groups and other Seton Hall programs of social service and evangelization.
Just as Newman‘s life of continuous conversion is instructive, so is his era, because it is so
much like our own. As Notre Dame‘s Cyril O‘Regan said during the faculty seminar‘s second session, ―the 19th century is the culture of now‖ with
its focus on ―this world, money, fame.‖ It is all
there today as it was then: the outsized personalities, the divisions, even dueling media. Yet, the
standard of Catholicism perdures. ―Some persons
speak of it (the church) as if it were a thing of
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John Henry Newman
Paul F. Gibbons
Dr. O‘Regan began by presenting John
Newman as a prophet. In Hebrew a prophet is
called a nabi, while its etymology is uncertain, a
newer understanding of the root is simply ―to
speak, to utter words.‖ The historic meaning of
nabi established by biblical usage is "interpreter
and mouthpiece of God‖. The source of the
prophet‘s knowledge is Divine Revelation.1
Newman speaks of his own knowledge of
the truths of Christianity as a ―Revelatio revelata;
it is a definite message from God to man distinctly
conveyed by His chosen instruments, and to be
received as such a message; and therefore to be
positively acknowledged, embraced, and maintained as true, on the ground of its being divine,
not as true on intrinsic grounds, not as probably
true, or partially true, but as absolutely certain
knowledge, certain in a sense in which nothing
else can be certain, because it comes from Him
who neither can deceive nor be deceived.‖2
Just as the prophet acknowledged the
source of his revelation as Divine, ―I am putting
my words into your mouth,‖ ―Yahweh says this‖;
so Newman acknowledges a definite message
from God.
The task of the prophet was to deliver the
Word of the Lord to his hearers, the men of his
own day. The task required the prophet to ―read
the signs of the times‖ to effectively frame his
message. This message generally included accusation of failure to keep the Covenant, warnings of
punishment to come, punishment, repentance,
and return to Covenant values.
Whether eager to speak the Word of the
Lord, as Isaiah, ―Here I am Lord, Send me.‖; or
reluctant, as Moses the first and greatest of Israel‘s prophets, ―I am a slow speaker…Send anyone you will,‖ and Jeremiah, ―I am a child‖; the
prophet could not but speak the Word put into
his mouth by God.
The future component of the prophet‘s
message depended not on the ability of the
prophet to ―foresee the future,‖ but rather on his
knowledge of God and his confidence that God

would indeed fulfill his Covenant with his people.
It was his knowledge of the Covenant, of Israel‘s
past, which allowed the prophet to speak confidently of the future.
Dr. O‘Regan grants Newman the prophetic mantle; it is in more of an equivocal than a
univocal sense of the term. While Newman‘s own
knowledge is a definite message from God it is
mediated through His chosen instruments, the
prophet‘s message is a direct communication
from God himself. Recognizing this major difference between the two, in many other ways Newman is indeed a prophetic figure.
O‘Regan cites first the evidence for Newman‘s prophetic motivation; Newman could not
not speak the message, nor witness the variety of
his output for over sixty years. Secondly, Newman
was required to discern the times, and he found
the times dire indeed. The problem as he saw it
was the secularity of Christianity in society, a
moralistic rationalism relying on a distorted sense
of reason. Like Isaiah, Newman begins with a social critique, a diagnosis of the situation and then
presents a prescription, a means to redress the
situation. Newman finds the situation long in
coming, starting with the reformers and most
clearly exemplified in the writings of John Locke.
The cultural diagnosis reveals that God is dead
and society is focused on a narrow rationalistic
morality.
In this situation, as Christianity makes
peace with secularity, Christianity is beggared by
the transaction. Holiness is no longer viewed as
moral perfection in which man‘s actions play a
role. Rather sanctity is a pure gift from God with
God and Grace playing the only active role in the
giving.
Newman‘s prescription is to focus on the
modes of memory, to reclaim the Catholic tradition especially the authority of the Church and
the Catholic practices of liturgy, sacraments, asceticism and prayer. For Newman, Roman Catholicism is the only real religion, the only force
capable of stemming the rising tide of secularism.
―Turn away from the Catholic Church, and to
14

whom will you go? It is your only chance of
peace and assurance in this turbulent, changing
world. There is nothing between it and skepticism.‖3

ing and participating in the mystery that is at the
center of our faith and theology.5 6

According to O‘Regan, Newman finds the
Church ―Too complex to fail.‖ I was reminded by
this remark of G.K. Chesterton‘s (a fellow convert
to Catholicism) description of the Church touching lightly on its complexity.
―It was certainly odd that the modern
world charged Christianity at once with bodily
austerity and artistic pomp. But then it was also
odd, very odd that the modern world itself combined extreme bodily luxury with an extreme absence of artistic pomp. The modern man thought
Becket‘s robe too rich and his meals too poor. But
the modern man was really exceptional in history; no man before ever ate such elaborate dinners in such ugly clothes.
The fact that Swinburne was irritated at
the unhappiness of Christians and yet more irritated at their happiness was easily explained. It
no longer was a complication of diseases in
Christianity, but a complication of diseases in
Swinburne.
Its fierce crusaders and meek saints might
balance each other; still the crusaders were very
fierce and the saints were very meek, meek beyond all decency. The very people who reproached Christianity with the meekness and non
-resistance of the monasteries were the very people who reproached it with the violence and valor
of the Crusades. It was the fault of poor old Christianity (somehow or other) both that Edward the
Confessor did not fight and that Richard Coeur de
Leon did.‖4
Chesterton continues for many more
pages demonstrating how Christianity holds in its
heart, not compromise or balance, but two opposite ideas, both at full strength: God and Man, Divine and Human, Three and One, Faith and
Works, Grace and Nature, a Sinner Saved, Now
and not Yet, Reason and Mystery. Too complex to
fail.
One last thing I note, there seems to be a
confluence, at least in my reading, of a new recognition of the necessary role of liturgy in enter-

1 Catholic

Encyclopedia, online
Henry Newman, A Grammar of Assent , p. 294
3 Newman Reader- Discourses to Mixed Congregations p.283
4 G. K. Chesterton Orthodoxy, Kindle version Loc.
1218-1225
5 Benedict XVI, Jesus of Nazareth, Part Two, Kindle
version
6 Karen Armstrong, The Case for God, Kindle version
2 John
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Did Newman Go ―Beyond Objectivism and Relativism‖?
Anthony L. Haynor
The phrase, ―beyond objectivism and relativism,‖ is taken from the title of Richard J. Bernstein‘s much acclaimed book.1 In this seminal
work, Bernstein examines the efforts of contemporary philosophers (e.g. Gadamer, Habermas) in
reframing what has often been put forward as a
firm dichotomy between foundationalism and
anti-foundationalism. In light of the seminar facilitated so expertly and so powerfully by Professor Cyril O‘Regan, I would like to consider
whether or not Newman should be included
within this intellectual conversation. Does Newman contribute in a meaningful way to us getting
―beyond objectivism and relativism?‖ While my
answer is ―Yes,‖ this project is fraught with difficulty, and in the effort to transcend or harmonize
objectivism and relativism significant hurdles
surface. This is no less the case with Newman as
it is with other thinkers involved in this project.
Newman clearly gives primacy to the phenomenological basis of belief. A crucial question
for him was not ―What should we believe?‖ but
rather ―How do we believe?‖ Newman approaches this latter question by positing the
―domain-specific‖ nature of knowledge. Human
beings approach the Divine, the natural world,
the aesthetic realm, and the moral realm by
drawing on presuppositions, paradigms, and
methodologies specific to each, and these presuppositions, paradigms, and methodologies are
―incommensurable‖ to a significant extent. To
take it one step further, the presuppositions,
paradigms and methodologies drawn upon can
very well be ―incommensurable‖ within any
given domain (so that there can be presuppositional, paradigmatic, and methodological disputes
vis-à-vis our apprehension and comprehension of
the Divine (within the discipline of theology), nature (within particular scientific disciplines),
Beauty (within aesthetics) and Goodness (within
ethics). From a phenomenological standpoint,
how we apprehend and comprehend the reality
(in its myriad forms) is dependent on ―traditions‖
that make it plausible to us. Our ―knowledge‖ of
any given domain is linked inextricably to a
―discourse.‖ For most of us most of the time our
knowledge is ―implicit,‖ that is, ―taken-for
granted.‖ While in this mode of consciousness,

we do not adopt a ―critical‖ stance in relation to it,
that is, we do not feel obligated to give a formal
―account‖ or ―defense‖ of it (unless and until we
are challenged to do so, or facts or experiences
impel or compel us to bring our previously takenfor-granted presuppositions, paradigms, and
methodologies to the level of self-conscious
awareness and critical examination). The transition from ―implicit‖ to ―explicit‖ knowledge is
one that is clearly valued by Newman, but he realized that in the normal course of events it is one
that does not and need not occur. He also recognized that a preoccupation with ―explicit‖ knowledge is the province in large part of
―professional‖ theologians, scientists, aesthetic
scholars, and ethicists.
For Newman, then, belief does not require
demonstrative proof. If ―implicit‖ (in which category most belief falls) then it is by definition not
demonstrated. But, even ―explicit‖ knowledge
does not require demonstration. In attempting to
make sense of what Newman said, it seems to me
that knowledge as ―implicit‖ is ―plausible‖ as a
taken-for-granted reality, and as ―explicit‖ is
―reasonable‖ as a judged reality.2 In neither case
is it a reality that is grounded in or requires demonstrative proof. Newman‘s notion of belief
(defined in terms of its plausibility or reasonableness) is a profoundly communal one. Christian
belief, in particular, is necessarily grounded in a
thick set of cultural practices which sustain it and
help confer plausibility on it. Disciplined reflection on these practices enables Christianity to pass
the test of reasonableness. Sacred scripture, the
sacramental life, and the evolution of doctrine
guided by recognized ―guardians‖ of the faith all
play an indispensable role in sustaining the plausibility and reasonableness of Christian belief. To
the degree that these features of the tradition are
gutted or delegitimized, plausibility and reasonableness will suffer. This was Newman‘s great
fear.
To this point, Newman seems to be arguing that belief (Christian or otherwise) must go
through the ―fiery brook of relativity.‖3 How so?
Belief seems to be defined in terms of that which
strikes human beings as plausible (at the implicit
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level) or reasonable (at the explicit level) given a
particular communal frame of reference. What
seems to be lacking is any common measure capable of determining the truth value of any given
belief system. Newman‘s position leaves us with
―horizons‖4 that are incommensurable. There
seems to be no ―objectivist‖ possibility in Newman‘s stance. Now, there is no question that
Newman believes that Christianity represents the
fullness of truth. Such an assertion is clearly objectivist in tone. Yet, how can that fullness be
proven or demonstrated after we are presented
with the argument that beliefs are only plausible
or reasonable in relation to a particular communal discourse. What Newman is saying is that an
objectivist conclusion can only be reached from
or through a relativistic starting point. Newman‘s
―illative sense‖ refers to the cultivation of a state
of mind that continually tests the plausibility and
reasonableness of one‘s belief system.5 This requires entering into ongoing dialogue with other
belief systems (within and between domains) in
order to explore integrative possibilities. Newman‘s relativistic bent can be seen in his assertion
that it is only in terms of the ―old‖ that the ―new‖
can be encountered. It is only through the prism
of the paradigm to which one is already committed that an alternative framework or discourse
can in any way be fused with it. For Newman,
not only is Christianity both plausible and reasonable, but it is best positioned, so to speak, to incorporate other systems of cognitive, aesthetic,
and moral belief. (This integrative and holistic
vision was articulated in Newman‘s Idea of a University.) It is precisely out of a commitment to the
plausibility and reasonableness of Christianity (a
commitment that is sustained by its communal
practices) that an expansive objective truth can
begin to be uncovered.
Newman rejected the liberal (that is
Enlightenment) prejudice against prejudice,
which positioned him as a CounterEnlightenment thinker. However, he argued that
it is only out of a Christian prejudice that a more
objective (non-prejudiced) truth is possible. In
this sense, Newman did go beyond relativism and
objectivism. But, did Newman show convincingly
why one ―prejudice‖ however plausible and reasonable is a more preferable starting point than
another? Did he show how a Christian starting
point leads to a more preferable end point than a
non-Christian one? Rooting objectivism in the

soil of relativism is tricky indeed.

1

Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism
(University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983).
2
See Joseph Dunne, Back to the Rough Ground (University
of Notre Dame Press, 1993) for the argument that Newman’s
concept of reasoned judgment draws heavily on Aristotle’s
notion of phronesis.
3
See Ludwig Feuerbach, Fiery Brook: Selected Writings
(Doubleday, 1973) and Peter L. Berger, A Rumor of Angels
(Knopf Doubleday, 1970).
4
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method. Seabury Press,
1975.
5
See Frederick D. Aquino, Communities of Informed Consent: Newman’s Illative Sense and Accounts of Rationality
(Catholic University of America Press, 2004).
17

Newman‘s Liberalism
Eric M. Johnston
One can hardly read the works of Bl. John
Henry Cardinal Newman (1801-95), especially
his great autobiography, Apologia Pro Vita Sua,
without being struck by his virulent antiliberalism. Perhaps this was a sign of the times:
Newman entered the Church in 1845, the first
year of the pontificate of Bl. Pius IX, known by the
Italian pun ―Pio No-No‖: the pope of the Syllabus
of Errors. Yet Newman was seen in the Church of
his age as something of a liberal himself, and has
inspired a certain kind of liberalism in the century since his death.1 We can better understand
both Newman himself, and his prophetic read of
the times, by distinguishing the kind of liberalism
he criticized from the kind he promoted.

comes out in the last chapter of The Grammar of
Assent (1870). In context, his aim is to show how
Christianity accords with the natural religion
proposed by the conscience of people in every age.
Along the way, however, he emphasizes the difference between what conscience proposes and
what he believes to be the errors of modern
―civilization.‖5 The key point of natural religion
as he thinks conscience presents it is our need to
make atonement for sin and guilt. To this ―severe
aspect‖ he adds positive things such as the consolation of prayer; but he thinks any true religion
needs to recognize our severe distance from God
as of far greater importance than mere moral effort.6

The most obvious place to look for Newman‘s critique of liberalism is to his ―Note A,‖ entitled simply ―Liberalism,‖ at the end of the Apologia (1856). It is noteworthy that he begins by
expressing admiration for the French political figures Charles de Montalembert and Henri Lacordaire, who were a kind of liberal that he thinks he
can call ―conservative.‖2

False liberalism, it seems, differs from true
religion in failing to see our vast need in relation
to the highest things.

He defines liberalism as ―the exercise of
thought upon matters, in which, from the constitution of the human mind, thought cannot be
brought to any successful issue, and therefore is
out of place. . . . Liberalism then is the mistake of
subjecting to human judgment those revealed
doctrines which are in their nature beyond and
independent of it.‖3
He concludes with a kind of syllabus of
errors of his own, abjuring propositions such as
that science, including economic science, can
overturn teachings of faith, including moral
teachings; that education itself is the source of
virtue; and, perhaps most controversial now, that
the civil power has no role in maintaining religious truth. He seems to propose a vision of
Church and State in which the State has no right
to judge the Church, but the Church does have a
right to be aided by the State—because, apparently, the highest truths are matters of authority,
not of open inquiry.4
A broader condemnation of liberalism

Yet we should not fail to see in Newman‘s
own thought various strands that could themselves be called ―liberal.‖ The very context of his
condemnation of ―civilized‖—i.e., Victorian—
religion comes in the context of commending
both the natural aspirations of man, and his ability, through conscience, to discern the truth about
God, views that stand in striking contrast to the
Jansenism still so powerful in the Ireland and
France of his day.7
Indeed, the central argument of The
Grammar of Assent is that true assent to the faith
requires not only submission to authority, but
also a recognition that what authority teaches is
true, or at least in line with truths, according to
our own lights. True religion can never be
merely assent to authority.
This central Newmanian insight casts
Newman‘s condemnation of liberalism in a very
different light. Newman condemns his contemporaries for thinking they can do without authority, as if everything stands upon pure reason. But
Newman‘s response is not the standard ultramontanism of his times, which looked to papal
authority for all truth. Indeed, Newman was seen
as a liberal in the Church of his time for arguing
that Vatican I‘s definition of papal infallibility
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(1870), though true, was inopportune, encouraging a false reduction to authority. To the contrary,
Newman urged his contemporaries to see
whether the teachings of the Church did not conform with what they already knew in their conscience: a truly Thomistic confidence that genuine natural reason could never contradict the
teachings of faith.
Even Newman‘s teachings on Church and
State, which at first would seem to contradict
Vatican II‘s Declaration on Religious Liberty, end
up concurring with that document‘s teaching that
―man perceives and acknowledges the imperatives of the divine law through the mediation of
conscience. In all his activity a man is bound to
follow his conscience in order that he may come
to God, the end and purpose of life. It follows
that he is not to be forced to act in a manner contrary to his conscience.‖8 If, as Newman asserts
in his Note on liberalism, the civil power has a
duty to maintain religious truth, it is not to force
men to act against their conscience, but to give
them the opportunity to consider a position that
otherwise might be shouted down. Newman‘s
political conservatism ends up matching with his
championing of the university, as another way to
give people access to great ideas.
―Liberty of thought is in itself a good; but
it gives an opening to false liberty.‖9 In the end,
Newman‘s liberalism and his anti-liberalism
come together in an affirmation that there is a
Truth greater than, but accessible to, the human
mind. Conscience is not the right to make things
up, but the divine ability of man to see and know
the Truth.

1 See

for example ―Newman and the Second Vatican
Council,‖ a lecture presented by the English, Benedictine Bishop Christopher Butler, himself a prominent
voice at the Council. (Document available at: http://
www.vatican2voice.org/3butlerwrites/newman.htm.)
Butler not only shows Newman‘s immense contribution to Vatican II—especially on ―liberal‖ issues such
as a return to pre-scholastic sources; development of
doctrine; historical thinking; personal commitment;
and the role of the laity—but also highlights how
Newman was out of favor with the ultramontanists of
his time, especially his fellow convert Henry Edward
Manning, who, despite entering the Church six years
after him, was made a cardinal four years before, as
well as Archbishop of Westminster and thus head of
the Catholic Church in England.
2 Apologia, p. 254.
3 Ibid., p. 256.
4 Ibid., pp. 260-62.
5 See for example Assent, pp. 302-303.
6 See especially his commendation of the Anglican divine Joseph Butler (1692-1752), and his explanation
of how divine punishment, including vicarious punishment, accords with the truth that ―Finally, indeed
and upon the whole, every one shall receive according
to his personal deserts‖: in the mean time, being good
cannot help us avoid atoning suffering (pp. 308-309).
7 For a classic treatment of Jansenism, see especially
chapters IX and X of Ronald Knox‘s Enthusiasm: A
Chapter in the History of Religion.
8 Dignitatis Humanae, n. 3.
9 Assent, p. 255.
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Newman, the Scholars, and the Jews:
Newman‘s Use of the Old Testament in Grammar of Assent
in Contrast with 19th Century Biblical Criticism
Jeffrey L. Morrow
In the tenth chapter of his Grammar of
Assent, John Henry Newman devotes a substantial
portion of the second section, ―Revealed Religion,‖ to the discussion of biblical Judaism and the
Old Testament within salvation history (432459).1 Although it would be too Christocentric
for many Jewish readers, Newman‘s positive
treatment of the Old Testament and of biblical
Judaism contrasts with the intellectual trends of
the time period. The nineteenth century saw the
continual denigration of all things Jewish, especially the Old Testament as it was treated in biblical scholarship and the burgeoning field of the
History of Religions. Newman‘s understanding of
salvation history, however, makes it impossible
for him to ignore, minimize or disparage biblical
Judaism and the Old Testament, as did many of
his nineteenth century contemporaries, as well as
the philosophical predecessors who serve as his
interlocutors. Indeed, Newman‘s arguments here
rely on the importance of the Old Testament as a
context for understanding the New Testament.
Newman‘s use of the Old Testament in the
context of salvation history in his Grammar of
Assent indicates the necessity of the Old Testament and biblical Judaism for understanding Jesus, the New Testament, and thus for Newman,
the Catholic Church. At the outset of his discussion in this section of Chapter 10, Newman writes,
―Here, then, I am brought to the consideration of
the Hebrew nation and the Mosaic religion, as the
first step in the direct evidence for Christianity.‖
He immediately follows with a laudatory statement about the Jewish people: ―The Jews are one
of the few Oriental nations who are known in
history as a people of progress, and their line of
progress is the development of religious
truth‖ (432). In particular, Newman isolates their
faith in the one God as the center around which
their life and witness revolved. Among a host of
positive comments Newman makes regarding the
Jewish people and their monotheistic faith (what
Newman terms ―Theism‖), he includes, ―of this
truth [Theism] their poetry is the voice, pouring
itself out in devotional compositions which Christianity, through all its many countries and ages,
has been unable to rival‖ (433).

In preparation for his discussion of Christianity—indeed, as evidence he marshals in defense of Christianity—Newman reviews Old Testament salvation history by highlighting the many
ways that it prepared for the coming of Christ: in
Genesis this Abrahamic people was chosen by
God to be a blessing to the nations (441-442);
this promise continues with Isaac and Jacob, and
thus the Israelites (442); the future Christ who
would usher in this worldwide blessing would
come from the line of Jacob‘s son Judah (442443). Although Jewish readers might be uncomfortable with lines that appear supersessionistic,
Newman‘s comments tie Christianity inextricably
to its Old Testament and Jewish roots, contrasting
with his contemporaries who maligned the Old
Testament and Judaism. Newman observes unambiguously that Christianity ―issued from the Jewish land and people‖ (437).
This stark difference is remarkable given
the earlier and contemporary discussions that
form part of the intellectual context within which
he writes. One of his main intellectual interlocutors in Grammar of Assent, for example, is John
Locke, whom Newman explicitly engages prior to
the chapter under discussion (e.g., 160-164, 174,
and 176).2 Locke‘s Essay Concerning Human Understanding provides an interesting contrast with
the earlier portions of Newman‘s Grammar of Assent, but Locke‘s other works, like The Reasonableness of Christianity, especially indicate the
extent to which Locke‘s vision of Christianity was
de-Judaized (Gerdmar; Sutcliffe). Locke‘s biblical
exegesis was indebted to earlier and contemporary trends within seventeenth century biblical
criticism. One of the most foundational early
modern biblical critics is Richard Simon whose
Histoire critique du Vieux Testament was instrumental for Locke, who owned two copies of the
text (Champion). Simon, Locke and others effectively deconstruct the Old Testament for political
and theological ends in order to minimize any
form of transnational Catholicism and contemporary Judaism.
Judaism and the Old Testament became
the convenient whipping boy in the Enlighten20

ment period that preceded Newman, and this was
evident especially in biblical studies (Manuel;
Kugel; Legaspi). Eric Nelson explains that, ―when
the philosophes looked at the Hebrew Bible, they
rarely liked what they saw. … Recast as a tribal
relic from the primitive past, the Pentateuch
could safely be dismissed as absurd and uncivilized…‖ (139). The nineteenth century biblical
criticism which flourished especially in Germany
had arrived from earlier Locke- and John Tolandinspired biblical criticism in England, and was repollinating English academic circles during the
general time Newman wrote Grammar of Assent
(Rogerson; Sheehan). Anti-Semitism and antiJudaism often went hand-in-hand with such
scholarship, as well as with the broader trends in
History of Religions scholarship, which both relied upon and influenced developments within
biblical studies (Masuzawa). Within a matter of
decades, Adolf von Harnack would seek the removal of the Old Testament from Christian Scripture, and Friedrich Delitzsch would urge the replacement of the Old Testament with German
folklore (Arnold and Weisberg; Kinzig). Nor were
these Marcionite tendencies isolated events. Jewish scholars of the Bible have been adept in recognizing the anti-Jewish underpinnings of some
of the nineteenth century scholarly trends that
rendered the Old Testament useless as a source of
religious authority (Schechter; Kaufmann; Levenson; Weinfeld).
Alfred Loisy was one of the most significant biblical scholars in the Catholic world of the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and
he imbibed many of these same anti-Jewish methodological frameworks for his study of the Old
Testament and the origins of Christianity. Yet
Loisy saw himself as following the trail Newman
blazed, and he justified his work as a continuation of Newman‘s by applying Newman‘s developmental notions within the biblical texts themselves (Talar; Hill; Loisy 1900; Loisy 1902). When
we compare Newman‘s own views on the Old
Testament and biblical Judaism, and their relationship to Jesus, to Christianity, and to the
Catholic Church however, we find a stark contrast with these other frameworks that diminish
the importance of the Old Testament by questioning its authenticity and its authority. The trend
from Locke to von Harnack was to de-Judaize Jesus and Christianity and to minimize the Old Testament through literary and historical decon-

struction, methods adopted by Loisy. In contrast,
Newman‘s work indicates that Christianity cannot be understood apart from its Jewish origins,
and this makes Newman‘s work all the more significant.

1

2.10.2.6-2.10.2.9 for those using a different edition of this
text.
2
2.6.1.
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Appreciating the Catholic Studies‘ Seminars: An Outlier‘s Perspective
Athar Murtuza
During my first extended stay in a Muslim
country, Bangladesh, I experienced a palpable
sense of the presence of God in ―ordinary believers,‖ finding that we shared a faith in God, however different the faith-traditions may be, our
God was clearly the same. (David B. Burrell,
C.S.C)
Since the summer of 1999, as an accounting professor and a Muslim, I have attended four
of the intellectual feasts organized by the Center
for Catholic Studies for Seton Hall University‘s
faculty. They have intimated to my imagination
the time when the earlier Abbasid caliphs, the
best of them, established their capital in the newly
founded city of Baghdad and constructed within
it the Bayt al-Hikma (House of Wisdom). The
Bayt al Hikma of Baghdad had a sibling in the
South Asian court of Emperor Akbar, who ruled
from 1556 to 1605 CE. A contemporary of the
Virgin Queen of England, Queen Elizabeth, Akbar used to hold seminars where Muslim Scholars
[alims] would debate religious matters with intellectuals of all faith, including atheists, Jews,
and Portuguese Roman Catholic Jesuits—
Protestants had not yet made it to India. Akbar, a
Muslim, treated these religious leaders with great
consideration, irrespective of their faith, and revered them, not unlike the Muslim Sultan in
Egypt who behaved similarly with St. Francis in
another place and time. A recent novel by Salman Rushdie‘s Enchantress of Florence provides
an imaginative linkage between the court of Akbar and the city of Florence during the High Renaissance, where Niccolò Machiavelli takes a starring role in what the blurb for the novel describes
as ―the true brutality of power.‖ Yet another account of that era Trickster Travels: A SixteenthCentury Muslim Between Worlds by Dr. Natalie
Zemon Davis serves as a treat for the intellect and
a corrective to conventional perceptions about the
clash of civilization.
A more recent echo the Msgr. Richard
Liddy‘s seminars create for me is a recollection of
Rudyard Kipling‘s famous (in-famous!) verses:
OH, East is East, and West is West, and never the
twain shall meet,
Till Earth and Sky stand presently at God‘s great

Judgment Seat;
But there is neither East nor West, Border, nor
Breed, nor Birth,
When two strong men stand face to face, tho‘ they
come from the ends of the earth!

The first line has become a commonplace
in this post-modern, post-colonial world of ours.
Yet to only quote the first line is to misconstrue
the poem‘s intent. What matters for a proper understanding of the poem as well as Kipling‘s overall message are the last two lines quoted above.
What the alleged drum-beater of the British Empire is implying is not all that different from what
St. Paul envisioned about Jews and gentiles coexisting in the commonwealth of Christ. In
Kipling‘s case, he wanted the rulers and ruled to
have a position similar to that of Jews and gentiles
in St. Paul‘s vision, something I argued in my doctoral dissertation back in 1977.
For me the seminars have been extremely
valuable. I would say that attending them has
done for me something akin to the knowledge
David Burrell acquired in Bangladesh. While attending the Catholic Studies seminar, one finds
the silos, academic, religious, social, and economic, dissolving and one feels transported to the
kind of university envisioned by John Henry
Newman. The business schools, given their ethos
of maximizing shareholders‘ wealth while ignoring the social and moral considerations, seem
more like voc-tech for money mongers. Ideally,
business schools can do well to require their students to devote their undergraduate degree to
learning as envisioned by Newman and then have
students follow it with a graduate degree that will
introduce them to business disciplines. Such integrated learning, besides making students more
employable, could develop a greater sense of social empathy and moral imagination, which could
perhaps even curb what seems like the unchecked greed, or even old-fashioned idolatry of
money.
At present, most business schools seem a
copy of the school located in the Coketown of
Charles Dickens‘ Hard Times, much too bitzered
to see a horse as anything but factual:
―'Quadruped. Graminivorous. Forty teeth, namely
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twenty-four grinders, four eye-teeth, and twelve
incisive. Sheds coat in the spring; in marshy
countries, sheds hoofs, too. Hoofs hard, but requiring to be shod with iron. Age known by
marks in mouth.‖ Their obsession to factual
makes the likelihood of their discerning the
apocalyptic potential of what the unbridled worship of capitalism unleashes: Conquest, War,
Famine and Death. It would be better if the business students could be made to see the implication of various encyclicals issued by the Vatican
on work, wealth, and human dignity, which
make clear that the unchecked power of wealth
can and does, thwart one‘s connection with one‘s
faith. Not unlike the parable of Last Judgment in
Matthew 25:31-46 is the verse 39 in the 30th
chapter of the Qur‘an which contrast wealth
which is acquired and hoarded with wealth that
is shared with the needy and promotes social justice. A similar sense of social justice imbues the
scriptures and traditions of other faiths, as noted
in Small Is Beautiful: Economics As If People Mattered by British economist E. F. Schumacher.
Knowing this ought to make the seeding of Business students‘ moral imagination easier.
Newman‘s view of Islam, which is the
subject of this essay, is a very small part of his
scholarship. It has nothing to do with his accomplishment. His stature is secure and is not denigrated by his having accepted the conventional
view of Islam held on both sides of the Atlantic
for almost a thousand years. My reason for writing this essay is to urge that these views that are
still held by a very large multitude are wrong and
dangerous. They are helping to create the fog
which prevents Americans from seeing 9/11 as a
reaction against American foreign policies. No
one can justify the terrorism unleashed but the
failure to see not only the horrible event of 9/11
as well as the terrorist acts that followed as being
a response to our governmental policies all
through the cold war and since is only making
the problem worse. Unfortunately most Americans do not even know what is done by their government officials. The virtually total lack of public awareness as regards the incidence dating
back to June 1967 involving the USS Liberty is a
good illustration of the civic ignorance and lack
of political accountability. The perception of Islam as a fanatical enemy of Western values and
its linkage to the Anti-Christ is making the Military Industrial complex even more dominant.
President Eisenhower‘s warning remains valid

given this expansion of war profiteers, a simultaneous weakening of the US economy, and the increase in the foreign debt that was used for waging unneeded wars against the wrong targets.
Newman does mention the Paraclete from
the Bible and in so doing seem to acknowledge a
possible link between the Bible and the Prophet
Muhammad but he dismisses the connection in
short order. What Newman and many others fail
to note in the same Bible that links Jesus to the
promise made to Abraham also promises similar
blessings to the progeny of the first born
(rightful?) heir of the Patriarch. A Muslim perspective of this can be seen at the web site
<http://www.islamicity.com/mosque/
muhammad_bible.htm>.
In fairness to Newman, his view of Islam is
a lot more benign than those of Franklin Graham,
Pat Robertson, Jerry Falwell, certainly Pastor Terry
Jones, a bushel of Republican presidential wannabees and Geert Wilders---collectively these sages
are working up a North American kristallnacht
with considerable help from the descendants of
those victimized by the German kristallnacht.
Newman‘s remarks are less frightening than the
view of Islam and Muslims depicted in
―Obsession: A view of Radical Islam;‖ 28 million
copies of which were distributed in the swing
states during the last presidential election
through the resources furnished by Israeli Aish
HaTorah and its related Clarion Fund.
The charge against Islam of containing
nothing new remains persistent but one needs to
remember that Islam does not consider itself to be
new. An informed Muslim could easily see it as a
continuation, completion, clarification, and reformation of the tradition that has always sought
through divinely guided messengers to make human beings live a life in which faith matters, and
in which others are treated as one would like to
be treated. Karen Armstrong‘s perception of the
Axial Age and its extension to include Judaism,
Christianity, and Islam is much in line with the
Qur‘anic exhortations. Furthermore, those who
allege Islam‘s lack of universality need only a visit
to any of the sprouting mosques in North America
to realize that they are the most integrated places
in the United States during the five daily prayers
and especially at noon on Fridays. The universality realization can also be facilitated from knowing that coffee, cotton, checkbook, chemistry,
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college, common law, the Magna Carta, courtly
love, love sonnets, the Arabic names of the most
of the known stars, Cervantes‘s Don Quixote,
Aquinas‘ Summa, and Dante‘s Divine Comedy, his
Beatrice, and his election to write in Italian all
have Islamic antecedents.
Even in Newman‘s own era, Islam‘s universality was being demonstrated in a very interesting cultural transfer. It is well described by
William Dalrymple in his 2007 review of a seminal exhibit about the ties that reviewed Venice‘s
relationship with its Islamic neighbors from 7th to
17th centuries at the New York‘s Metropolitan
Museum of Art: ―Ironically, the most remarkable,
and certainly the most unlikely, export of Venetian culture was still to come‖ and it did so
through the British. When British Raj began looking for an architectural style which would not
look incongruent in India they turned to Ruskin's
Stones of Venice. The reason the style fits in so
well in India has to do with the fact that the
stones of Venice themselves had come from the
Islamic world, which also left its legacy throughout India. The transfer of culture from Spain,
Anatolia, Cairo, Baghdad, Damascus, and quite
possible Delhi, to Venice and then to the British
occupied India suggests an alternative way of
looking at the world, unlike that proposed by
Huntington through his thesis about the clash of
civilizations.

scrolls [or cultures] that get overwritten by another text, but where the original still remains
visible or discernable. Seen thus, the Enlightenment, the Western civilization and even Modernity can be seen as palimpsests where the contributions of what came before, such as the Islamic
contributions, are very much discernable, though
awaiting greater attention. Such awareness
would make us avoid perceptions that come
through in the sketch attached as an appendix to
this essay; it shows St. Thomas inspired by Christ
in glory and guided by Moses, St. Peter, and the
evangelists, and instructed by Aristotle and Plato,
overcoming Abū l-Walīd Muḥammad bin ʾAḥmad
bin Rušd (Averroes), who lies vanquished under
St. Thomas‘s feet.
Our world will be a better place if the
view point shown in the sketch is replaced by one
sought by David Burrell in his Knowing the Unknowable God (1986) and Freedom and Creation
in three Traditions (1993), as well as translations
of three major works of the ‗Islamic Augustine,‘ al
-Ghazali. Adopting the approach suggested in
Burrell‘s essay titled ―The Abrahamic Faiths in
their New Context‖ provides a much better and
needed alternative (the essay by Burrell is available at the web site http://www.nd.edu/
~dburrell/jcmexchange.html).

Cultures and Civilization do not exist in
discrete silos. Even though thinking thus can lead
many to fantasize that the birth of Western Civilization as having been independent of what came
before and after; however, civilization, renaissances, and Modernity did not show up in Europe
fully formed like a Barbie doll and ready to ovulate. Even the very idea of Europe was the result
of presumed dangers from Islamic influences.
That the center of gravity as far as the game of
cricket, more popular than baseball and basketball around the world, has shifted to India from
England; that the Man Booker Prize is routinely
awarded to people with Indian origins; that the
Indian firm Tata now owns the British Jaguar;
and that fish and chips as a staple of the British
diet have been replaced by the South Asian import, chicken tikka, should make one see that the
relationship between civilizations is not like that
between discrete and segregated silos and is
much more like a palimpsest, to borrow a term
from post-colonial theories. The palimpsests are
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Appendix

The sketch shows St. Thomas inspired by Christ in
glory and guided by Moses, St. Peter, and the
evangelists, and instructed by Aristotle and Plato,
overcoming Averroes, who lies vanquished under
St. Thomas‘s feet. From An Introduction to the
History of Science, by Walter Libby (1917,
Houghton Mifflin, New York,NY, p.56.
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Newman, Barth and Natural Theology
David W. Opderbeck
Newman‘s religious epistemology in A
Grammar of Assent can strike the contemporary
reader as unduly focused on loneliness, fear, and
judgment. His ―first lesson‖ of natural religion is
the absence and silence of God.1 Indeed, ―[n]ot
only is the Creator far off,‖ he suggests, ―but
some being of malignant nature seems . . . to have
got hold of us, and to be making us his sport.‖2
All religions, Newman argues, understand that
humans are separated from God, and seek to find
respite from God‘s judgment through prayer, rites
of satisfaction, and the intercession of holy men.
The preparation for revealed religion, in
Newman‘s estimation, is a sense of foreboding – a
sense that seems quite distant from the appeal to
symmetry and aesthetics that characterized Aquinas‘ Five Ways. It is also far distant, as Newman
acknowledges, from the mechanistic remonstrations of William Paley‘s watchmaker. While
Paley‘s God – and perhaps, in Newman‘s estimation, Thomas‘ God – could turn out to be any sort
of master tinkerer, merely a Platonic ideal of the
Victorian gentleman naturalist, the God prefigured by Newman‘s natural religion must be more
viscerally terrible. For Newman, ―[o]nly one religion,‖ Christianity, supplies a God capable of
dishing out, and absorbing, this sort of pain.
Newman‘s focus on anxiety seems to prefigure the existentialist theologies that would
come to define the twentieth century, particularly
those of Karl Barth and Hans Urs von Balthasar.
But Newman was more an Augustinian than
Barth or Balthasar, particularly in his construction of revelation and authority. For Newman,
the bulwark of revealed religion was the institutional infallibility of the Roman Church. Yet even
here Newman recognized a dynamic aspect to the
Church‘s authority. The decisions of Popes and
Councils, he recognized, were often mired in jealousies and politics.3 Still, the Church reached its
conclusions over time spans measured in hundreds and thousands of years. Time, and patience,
and the slow work of God‘s Spirit, ensured that
the Church would preserve the truth against the
vicissitudes of intellectual fashions.

condition, was remarkably consonant with Newman‘s. For Barth, following Luther, Humanity
stood separated from a hidden God. And Barth
repeatedly affirmed that ―there is no possibility of
dogmatics at all outside the Church.‖4 It might
seem that Barth and Newman were following
similar lights.
However, Barth was notoriously less sanguine – indeed, not at all sanguine – about the
possibility of any sort of natural theology. He refused any prior anthropological basis for theology.
Moreover, because, in Barth‘s view, dogmatics
always is a fresh encounter with revelation, he
likewise would not assign the final say to any person within or document produced by the Church.
The Roman Catholic approach to dogmatics, even
when it understood the Church‘s teaching office
to embody genuine progress over time, ―fails to
recognize the divine-human character of the being of the Church.‖5 According to Barth, ―[t]he
freely acting God Himself and alone is the truth of
revelation . . . only in God and not for us is the
true basis of Christian utterance identical with its
true content. Hence dogmatics as such does not
ask what the apostles and prophets said but what
we must say on the basis of the apostles and
prophets‖.6
It is curious that Barth does not cite Newman in
this section of the Dogmatics.7 More similarities
perhaps appear between this section of the Dogmatics and Newman‘s construal of Church authority than otherwise meet the eye. Newman‘s
discussion of the ―tyrannical interference‖ that
results when the Church acts too swiftly against
an apparently new opinion resonates with Barth‘s
understanding of the ―divine-human‖ Church.8
If Christian belief and practice has varied since
the inception of the Church, for Newman, this
only reflects ―the necessary attendants on any
philosophy or polity which takes possession of the
intellect and heart, and has had any wide or extended dominion.‖9 Great ideas can only be fully
comprehended over time, particularly when communicated through human media to human recipients, even though transmitted ―once for all by
inspired teachers.‖10

Karl Barth‘s theological anthropology, and
his resulting appraisal of the ―natural‖ human
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Nevertheless, Newman ultimately sides
with history over experience: ―[t]o be deep in
history,‖ he said, ―is to cease to be a Protestant.‖11
For Barth, revelation is ever and again (to use a
Barthian turn of phrase) a fresh encounter with
Christ, scripture, and the proclamation of the
Church; for Newman, revelation is complete, and
what remains is only the development of the
Church‘s understanding and possession of what
has been delivered. Yet Newman and Barth seem
to agree that natural theology, at most, highlights
God‘s hiddenness. Nature tells us nothing about
God except that God is beyond us, terrible and
unreachable.
Is there space for natural theology between the poles of revelation-disclosed-in-history
(Newman) and revelation-disclosed-inexperience (Barth)? Newman rejected the Anglican via media, which, as Newman described it,
sought to ―reconcile and bring into shape the
exuberant phenomena under consideration by
cutting off and casting away as corruptions all
usages, ways, opinions, and tenets, which have
not the sanction of primitive times.‖12 This position of ―neither discarding the Fathers nor acknowledging the Pope,‖ Newman thought, cannot
resolve hard cases.13 However, splitting the difference between history and experience is not the
only possible ―third way.‖ Perhaps Newman‘s
―natural religion,‖ although it pointed towards
the cross and the Resurrection, did not fully account for the cross and the Resurrection in the
history of creation.
The suffering and separation of creation –
our suffering and our separation from God – was
taken up and transformed by the cross of Christ.14
The cross reveals that the Logos who created the
universe is the suffering servant who became incarnate, God and man, and who in the flesh of
man suffered for us and with us. In the cross and
Resurrection, God is not distant or hidden – indeed, in the cross and Resurrection, the shape and
purpose of creation is disclosed. In the cross, history and experience join together; in the Resurrection, history and experience are fulfilled.
Through the cross and the Resurrection, we recognize in creation the love and beauty of the God
who declared the universe ―good,‖ the God who
made us, and who accepts us by grace despite our
sin. Because the cross and the Resurrection are
the center of history and experience, we can delight in creation as gift and know God in creation

as the giver of all good gifts. This is true
―natural‖ theology.

A Grammar of Assent, p. 301.
., p. 302.
3 See Apologia Pro Vita Sua, p. 232-33.
4 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, (T&T Clark Study
1

2 Ibid

Edition, 2009) (hereinafter ―CD‖), I.1.3., at p. 17.
5 CD 1.1.2, at p. 14.
6 CD I.1.2, at p. 15. It follows for Barth, then, that
“the place from which the way of dogmatic
knowledge is to be seen and understood can be neither
a prior anthropological possibility nor a subsequent
ecclesiastical reality, but only the present moment of
the speaking and hearing of Jesus Christ himself, the
divine creation of light in our hearts.‖
CD I.1.2, at p. 41.
7 He cites Diekamp, Katholic Dogmatik, 6th ed. (1930).
See CD, I.1.1, at p. 14.
8 Apologia, at p. 232-33.
9 Ibid. at 67.
10

Ibid.

An Essay on the Development of Christian
Doctrine, in ―Conscience, Consesus, and the Develop11 Newman,

ment of Doctrine,‖ (Doubleday, 1992), at p. 50. ―And
whatever history teaches, whatever it omits, whatever
it exaggerates or extenuates, whatever it says and
unsays,‖ Newman said, ‖at least the Christianity of
history is not Protestantism. If ever there were a safe
truth, it is this.‖ Id. at 50.
12 Ibid. at. 52.
13 Ibid. at 53.
14 See Jurgen Moltmann, The Crucified God, (Fortress
Press 1972).
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Secular Music, Social Reform, and the Church in the Modern World1
Gloria J. Thurmond
The cultural and social currents that
transform a society are inevitable and present in
every age. The period of transition within the society between the old ways and the new trends
may be described as a time of crisis and opportunity. When the established ways of thinking and
acting are challenged, a crisis in confidence occurs. Simultaneously, however, there also exists
the opportunity and potential for intellectual,
moral, and spiritual expansion and expression
through the presence of new creative energies.
The thoughts and reflections presented by
the seminar facilitator Dr. Cyril O‘Regan on the
writings of John Henry Newman, nineteenth century Oxford academic and Anglican priest, addressed Newman‘s view and interpretation of the
secularization of religion within the Anglican
Church. Dr. O‘Regan rests his analysis of Newman‘s view of the secularization of religion in the
nineteenth century Anglican Church upon the
new philosophical, social, and scientific developments of the eighteenth century Enlightenment
era.
By way of comparison, the early flowering of the Western European Renaissance era
(15th c.) also was marked by new pathways of inquiry, innovation, exploration, world-changing
discoveries, and a type of creative musical expression that overflowed the traditional liturgical
boundaries of the Roman Catholic Church.
It has been recognized by historians and
theologians alike that the new ideas and the creativity that led to the new cultural and social forms
that emerged during the Renaissance and Enlightenment eras paved the way for the contemporary
ideas that affirm the dignity of each human being,
and that call for social justice for the common
good within the community.
The occurrence of economic growth in
Europe, an increase in population, the onset of
the Crusades and of other historical factors during the twelfth century influenced changes in the
way musicians approached Church music as well.
During that time, polyphony made its way gradually into Church music, replacing plainchant, the
official body of Church music, identified by is

monophonic (single-line) texture, dating from c.
604 CE.
Polyphony occurs when there are separate
voices singing diverging parts simultaneously.
Improvisation, which permitted freedom from a
certain body of agreed upon rules of music, along
with a later development of adding a secular text
over the liturgical text, also fostered the development of the polyphonic style, signaling an important development in the history of Western music
– yet one that ultimately would challenge the
Church‘s musical sense of ―right and wrong.‖
At the beginning of the sixteenth century,
the Catholic Church ―met the defection of its
northern brethren by starting a program of internal reform known as the Counter-Reformation.‖2
―From 1545 – 1563, a special Council, meeting
intermittently in the northern Italian city of Trent,
worked to formulate and pass measures aimed at
purging the church of abuses and laxities.‖ While
Church music was not a major agenda item for
the Council, ―it heard serious complaints.‖ The
major complaints were that polyphonic music
based on secular songs (while still including a
plainchant melody as an inner part) profaned the
Mass; ―complicated polyphony made it impossible
to understand the words, even when pronounced
correctly; musicians were accused of using inappropriate instruments, being careless, and having
irreverent attitudes.‖3
Contrary to popular notions and stories
that oftentimes have been circulated down
through the centuries, regarding the Council‘s
desire to banish the use of polyphony from
Church music, and that the ―Savior‖ of polyphony arrived in the person of the Italian composer
Giovanni Pierluigi da Palestrina (1525 or 1526 –
1594), the Council‘s official statement on
Church music reform was that ―They shall also
banish from church all music that contains,
whether in the singing or in the organ playing,
things that are lascivious or impure.‖4
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According to the late, foremost music historian of
the twentieth century, Donald Jay Grout, Palestrina, ―captured the essence of the sober, conservative aspect of the Counter-Reformation and
set the standard for polyphonic church music.‖5
He used plainchant in all parts of his compositions rather than to confine it to one voice; and
overall musical transparency, textual clarity, and
spiritual reverence define his compositional style.

ally progressive society under the leadership of
the Church. According to Pope Benedict XVI, the
purpose of Catholic Social Teaching ―is simply to
help purify reason and to contribute, here and
now, to … what is just [in human affairs in the
world.] The Church has to play her part through
rational argument and she is to reawaken the
spiritual energy without which justice…cannot
prevail and prosper.‖7

―Savior‖ or not, the ability of Palestrina to
provide a clear way to maintain the integrity of
liturgical music and to serve musical creative activity through the Church established the Church
as the arbiter of Western classical music, which
continued to evolve and emerge through the
Church.

In the foregoing instances, it can be seen
that individuals with religious integrity and creative vision were able to seize the opportunity to
advance God‘s kingdom here on earth through
the intersection of the sacred tradition and the
secular world of human affairs.

Just as the late Renaissance Church was
able to make a creative musical transition
through its liturgical music challenge, so was the
nineteenth century Church able to prove itself
capable of connecting its mission of love, salvation, and service in the world through the Gospel
of Jesus Christ to its social teaching as set forth in
the encyclical letter Rerum Novarum, widely considered to have been shaped by Pope Leo XIII.

As the agent of God‘s dynamic presence
and creative action in the world, the Roman
Catholic Church, at critical ventures in its existence, ―scrutinizes the signs of the times‖8 , reflects upon the societal issues and tasks by which
it is confronted; and, ever maintaining its integrity, charts its way forward by continuing its mission of bringing the good news of God‘s love and
salvation into the ever-changing world of human
affairs.

The themes of Rerum Novarum are focused around ―persons, systems, and structures –
the three coordinates that foster the promotion of
justice and peace, now established as integral to
the mission of the modern Church.‖6 The United
States Conference of Catholic Bishops has identified seven key themes of Catholic Social Teaching
which have their roots in Rerum Novarum.








The sanctity of human life and dignity
of the person
Call to family, community, and participation
The right to life and to the necessities
of life
Preferential option for the poor and
vulnerable
Dignity of work
Solidarity towards the common good
Care for God‘s creation

The principles of Catholic Social Teaching,
having been set forth in the late nineteenth century, but considered to be far older in origin, have
continued to evolve through the need to address
and respond to the emerging issues of a continu-

The Documents of Vatican II, ―Gaudium et
Spes,‖ (1965)
2Donald Jay Grout, A History of Western Music, sixth
1

ed., (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001)
234.
3Ibid.
4Ibid.
5Ibid. 236
6Pope Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum, (1891)
7Pope Benedict XVI, Deus Caritas Est, 28, (2006)
8The Documents of Vatican II, ―Gaudium et Spes,‖ 4,
(1965)
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